28.11.2019 - 15:54

Lecture by Ningjing Ge at University of Macau

Why does Corruption Appear to be “Unavoidable”? – Tacit Rationality and the Reinforcement of Informal Institutions in China.  |  Nov. 28, 2019, 10.30–12 h  |  Room E21B-G002

Abstract
This study aims at disentangling an empirical puzzle that confronts many places where corruption is pervasive and routinised: Why does corruption – especially those in transaction forms – appear to be “unavoidable”? Building upon my research on China case, I argue that when corruption becomes an expected action that goes beyond individual choice, “unavoidable” does not signify legally-identified corruption per se, but a series of informal institutions which do not exclude corruption. Therefore, the crux of understanding why people consciously break or bypass formal institutions and participate in corrupt practices is to explain why certain informal patterns of behaviour that follow a similar operative logic with corruption constantly get reinforced while formally-coded rules appear to be merely
nominal. Ultimately, behind the empirical puzzle of “unavoidable” corruption lies the theoretical inquiry that what determines the effectiveness of an institution, which entails a frame that can link the analysis of individual decision-making process to the large social contextual structure.

Ningjing Ge is doctoral fellow at IN-EAST (DFG Research Training Group 1613 Risk and East Asia). She gained BA in Public Administration and Law at Tianjin University of Finance and Economics in 2010, and MA in Public Administration at University of Macau in 2013. Her current research focus lies on corruption in China and critical discourse analysis.