Administrative Reforms in Germany and China in Comparison [3]: Environmental administration in the Rural Areas (2008–2012)

A Policy Advisory Project

Joint project by Prof. Dr. Thomas Heberer, Prof. Dr. Dieter Grunow (University of Duisburg-Essen), and Prof. Dr. Yu Keping (China Center of Comparative Economics and Politics, Beijing), funded by the Franz Haniel Foundation

Most important results from the research project

The empirical observations allow the following conclusions:

• With regard to the types of problems which are related to environmental protection (EP) issues, a combination of natural phenomena and man-made interventions into nature – with their many negative effects – is on the agenda. This situation makes the policy field in China quite specific in comparison with others and at the same time similar to those found worldwide. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that man-made EP problems are very broad in scope and high in intensity in China due to rapid industrial development there. In other words: conflicts regarding EP in China are not different in kind but in intensity. The never-ending process of redefining old problems or of defining new ones includes the necessity to have societal actors who speak and decide on behalf of nature rather than merely reacting to developments. This is true above all in a situation in which the population is already “suffering” from EP deficiencies.
• In summarizing the problem situation it can be stated that EP problems are often both complex and seamless with regard to natural media, territory and other segments of nature and society. This puts high demands on public EP programs and their implementation structure and strategies regarding the division of labour, expertise, and coordination.
• In the three rural case studies key aspects of EP varied. Few of the problems (desertification; salting of ground water) had natural origins, most were manmade – but differed in the respective rural areas (land seizure by industrial development; soil erosion following deforestation; overuse of pesticides; plastic garbage; polluted rivers; non-potable water; etc.) from the problems affecting urban areas (air pollution from industry restaurants, motor vehicles, and special garbage (drug relicts); polluted rivers and water reservoirs; etc.).
• Existing programs directed at EP issues cover almost all of these problem areas. They are basically formulated on the central government level and filter from there down to the various lower echelons. The existing implementation gaps at the local level are the consequence of insufficient effectiveness of the rule of law. It is very seldom that compliance with EP regulations is enforced by appeals to the responsible law courts.

This has not only ex post de facto effects but also inhibits necessary preventive (anticipatory) functions. Central government is also responsible for the general architecture of the political administrative system (PAS) in the sense of both their constitutions and their administration design policies. Therefore, deficiencies of national policy making – with regard to rule of law, administrative macrostructures and coordination between policy fields – are relevant causes of implementation gaps.

Another aspect can be identified by looking at Germany, where the numbers of  political and societal (NGO) actors who impact on policy making are larger and are often very vocal in presenting their aims within a democratic context – thereby putting the conflicts very early on the political agenda. In China, the impact of NGOs on policy development is still very small; there is more presence concerning practical work on the local level: distributing information, collecting garbage, planting and watering trees etc.

• The overall implementation structure is fragmented in China, where a “double bind” of public administration and local party directives (including career incentives) makes consistent policy implementation rather unlikely. As a result, local variations in implementation structures and processes tend to be numerous and mostly represent reactions to EP policies or attempts to deal with special regional EP problems.
• The scope and the severity of implementation gaps varied in the three cases studied. The implementation gaps found on the local level involved the following key factors: insufficient financial resources and control capacity; dependence on local political will and priorities; lack of reflection on administrative arrangements; inadequate instruments of coordination within the three rural settings: EPB; EP policies; EP issues across territorial boundaries; inefficient data processing and information logistics; a lack of relevant knowledge and training among staff members; little impact from NGOs and complaint systems.

These key factors were common, but all were not always present in the three observed cases. For example, we found better EP performance in the areas which were more politically engaged in EP issues and in those which had intelligent coordination tools, more financial resources, larger staffs, and/or a greater fund of technical and scientific knowledge.

• The possibility for improving EP policies and standards exists in China, as in many other countries. There are also many incentives for doing so (including prizes and additional funds). However, opportunities and incentives for “copying” good examples are currently inadequate. The truism must be repeated that every “solution” concerning EP problems and implementation arrangements in China and elsewhere is somehow imperfect, with both strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, the search for improvement is a continuous demand, along with the will to face new challenges and risks.
• The wider context of local EP implementation in China, meaning its political programs and PAS macrostructure in China, is more of a hindrance than a help. This is due to insufficient evolvement of a rule of law, the restricted role of civil society, the complicated system of staff placement and control structure by “two mothers-in-law” (i.e. public administration and the CCP), inadequate concepts of “Verwaltungspolitik”, and an over-cautious subordination of EP issues in the list of national goals defined by the central government.
• Even in this wider context, however, many aspects of local discretion offer the hope of achieving better EP performance. The similarities of some of China’s EP problems with those of other countries could make it possible for China to find successful models of local EP implementation.

Our field research revealed an ambivalent situation regarding environmental governance. On the one hand international and domestic pressure to cope with environmental issues and to implement stricter environmental policies by the state is continuously growing. Particularly in more advanced areas environment is increasingly becoming a hard criterion of evaluation. The central state is also interested to implement better environmental policies in order to reinforce legitimacy and secure stability. On the other hand due to its political priority setting the party-state adopts flexible policies and tolerates a gap in implementing central environmental policies at the local level. Local authorities often give preference to economic development and economic growth thus avoiding the closure of enterprises which could increase unemployment and therefore negatively affect GDP growth and social stability. Ultimately the central state is responsible as both economic growth and preserving socio-political stability gain top priority in national politics thus often assigning a subordinate role to the environment. Yet, with a rising environmental awareness among Chinese citizens the central state might have to modify its priority setting in the future. Environmental and climate protection are likely to become a third priority in national politics.

The upgrading of the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) to a ministry, the enormous amount of laws and regulations passed in recent years, a stricter enforcement of environmental regulations and the establishment of a broad variety of environmental funding programs illustrate that the significance of environmental issues is increasing. It also seems that the central state uses local requests for stricter environment protection, e.g. from NGOs, as a mechanism to put pressure on local authorities.

By strengthening environmental policies, the party-state also attempts to reinforce its legitimacy nationally and internationally and, in doing so, to preserve socio-political stability. An interest in maintaining stability presupposes a collective benefit for the actors involved. Both interests and benefits are ensured on different levels: a) on the part of the citizens by improving environment and ecology; b) on the part of the state by ensuring environmental protection, guaranteeing environmental standards, and installing tools for monitoring local authorities and policy implementation (e.g. through evaluations, cadres’ responsibility systems, etc.). Accordingly, a moderate institutional change in environmental governance can be observed, not occurring as a process triggered by a civil society but as a development driven by and taking place inside the Chinese state.

To sum up, the environmental policy output of the central government has noticeably increased. It has also intensified its pressure on local governments and pays more attention to environmental issues. Furthermore, local environmental protests are not always and automatically oppressed but used by the state to enforce better local environmental protection. The central state even contributes to strengthening the awareness of the people by disseminating information and knowledge on environmental issues through the media and the educational system. The media report on environmental issues and problems on a daily basis. In newspapers, television and broadcast there are special programs where people can complain and in each city or county environmental ‘hotlines’ (green 110) are available. Moreover, particularly the internet contributes to enhance and spread information on environmental problems and issues.

Undoubtedly, one-sided priorities and the implementation gap increasingly challenge the accountability of local authorities and compromise the legitimacy of both the local and the central state. Additionally, stability is affected where local authorities disregard environmental issues, albeit the Chinese case proves that stability at the local level could erode without having a direct impact upon the central government. Presumably the rising awareness of the urban middle classes might evoke social pressure that could spawn the state to endorse that environmental protection also becomes a key priority of Chinese politics.

Finally, how might the party-state contribute to elevating the role of environmental policies and make the environmental field more efficient? The party-state is certainly the principle actor which has to initiate and coin environmental policies. It should pay attention to the following five tasks: First, environment issues should become one of the top political priorities. So environment would become part of the local leading cadres’ incentive system. Second, the role of the local EPBs should be institutionally upgraded in becoming the major local coordinating body, preferably under the auspice of a local leader. Third, trans-local cooperation regarding environmental bodies might be supportive in order to solve problems in which several cities or counties became involved. Fourth, corporate social responsibility of enterprises could be fostered at the local level. Fifth, environmental governance, ecological issues and climate change should become prominent issues for the curriculum at party schools. Sixth, only to exert different forms pressure on local officials is not sufficient, localities need better financial means and know how in order to be able to protect the environment more effectively. Yet, it may last a long time until China could really realize what is called a “green modernity”.