Neil Roughley PhEEL

I have been Professor for Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics at Duisburg-Essen University since September 2009, where I am at present Deputy Head of Department. I work primarily on issues in metaethics, philosophical psychology, action theory and the philosophy of human nature.

Since 2018 I have co-organised the biannual workshop series MetaEssen and PhEEL, the first with various colleagues (Nick Laskowski, Hichem Naar, Stefan Mandl, Eleonora Severini, Wooram Lee, Katharina Sodoma and Sam Mason) and the second continuously with Hichem Naar. The workshops involve intense and extended discussions of pre-read texts focussed on one specified issue and provide an extremely fruitful context of detailed constructive debate. They are core structures of my Research Group, in which various larger projects have been based, projects concerning such topics as ethical particularism, automatic action, the place of norms in the human life form, and agential dimensions of emotions. We – particularly Christiana Werner and Katharina Sodoma – have recently been cooperating with the University of Liverpool to carry out a project funded by the German Research Foundation and the British AHRC, How Does it Feel? Interpersonal Understanding and Affective Empathy, a project that combines questions from epistemology, philosophy of mind, emotion theory and ethics.

Publikationen

Bücher

roughley_wantingroughley_wanting_back

Neil Roughley. Wanting and Intending. Elements of a Philosophy of a Practical Mind. Dordrecht: Springer 2016.

Cover Roughley (2019) The normative animalCover Rückseite Roughley Normative Animal

N. Roughley & K. Bayertz (Hg.). The Normative Animal? On the Anthropological Significance of Social, Moral and Linguistic Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019.

Cover Roughley (2018) Forms of fellow feeling


Cover Rückseite Roughley Forms of Fellow Feeling

N. Roughley & T. Schramme (Hg.). Forms of Fellow Feeling. Empathy, Sympathy, Concern and Moral Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018.

Cover Roughley (2018) Philosophical Psychology 31(5)

N. Roughley (Hg.). Sondernummer der Philosophical Psychology (Band 31, Ausgabe 5) zu Michael Tomasello's A Natural History of Human Morality, Juli 2018.

roughley_schaelike_wollen

mit Julius Schälike (Hg.). Wollen. Seine Bedeutung, seine Grenzen. Münster: mentis 2015.

roughley_schramme_sentimentalism

mit Thomas Schramme (Hg.). On Moral Sentimentalism. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 2015.

Cover Roughley (2000) Being Humans

Neil Roughley (Hg.) Being Humans. Anthropological Universality and Particularity in Transdisciplinary Perspectives. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter 2000.

Artikel und Kapitel in Büchern

Ausgewählte Artikel:

Human Nature. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021. URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/human-nature/

Moral Obligation from the Outside In, in N. Roughley, K. Bayertz (eds.), The Normative Animal? On the Anthropological Significance of Social, Moral and Linguistic Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019, 214-242: https://academic.oup.com/book/35330/chapter-abstract/300000169?redirectedFrom=fulltext

From Shared Intentionality to Moral Obligation? Some Worries, Philosophical Psychology 31/5 (July 2018): 736-754: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2018.1486610

The Empathy in Moral Obligation. An Exercise in Creature Construction, in: N. Roughley, T. Schramme (eds.), Forms of Fellow Feeling. Empathy, Sympathy, Concern and Moral Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018, 265-291: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/forms-of-fellow-feeling/empathy-in-moral-obligation/3DB67CF1CA4D42C509F93494147CE284

with M. Kronfeldner and G. Töpfer. Recent Work on Human Nature. Beyond Traditional Essences. Philosophy Compass 9 (2014): 642-652: https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12159