​I am a PhD student in first generation at the University of Duisburg-Essen, under the supervision of Professor Dr. Neil Roughley. I studied Philosophy and History at the University of Duisburg-Essen and received both my bachelor’s and my master’s degree there.  I speak German and English.

Within my PhD thesis I want to tackle different issues.

The first issue concerns the nature of epistemic blame. Here I will try to give answers to questions like: for what kind of epistemic failings can someone justifiably be epistemically blamed? What mechanism are involved in epistemic blame? Is epistemic blame comparable or even analogues to moral blame? Also, question concerning negative aspects imposed on epistemically blamed agents will be investigated. Is a sanctioning response for epistemic failings, such as false beliefs, bad belief formation practices or faulty reasoning ever justified. If blaming responses are justified for epistemic failings, what should those responses consist in?

The second issue concerns how an epistemically blamed agent can engage in epistemic rehabilitation. Blame seems to involve negative consequences for the blamed party, for example other agents might lose trust in the blamed agent. In the moral domain a blamed agent can engage in repair actions, like apologising and doing amends. So, the question can be raised if something similar can be identified within the epistemic domain. One obvious difference between the epistemic and moral domain consists in the fact that epistemic failings (never?) involve a victim which could demand reparation. This might suggest that epistemic rehabilitation is categorical different then moral rehabilitation.

Finally, I believe that investigating questions regarding epistemic blame can also be illuminating for other forms of blame, even well studied forms of blame, such as moral blame.

​I am a PhD student in metaethics at the University of Duisburg-Essen, under the supervision of Prof. Neil Routhley. My research interests include moral realism and especially the areas of evolutionary moral naturalist-realism which integrate multilevel selection theory. I am also interested in other aspects of natural normativity, as well as theories that could be used for applying naturalistic metaethical principles, such as game theory. I have a BA in Philosophy from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. After moving to Germany, I learned German and completed an MA in Philosophy at the Free University of Berlin, where I focused on topics such as moral realism and epistemology. I have also attended several academic conferences and workshops. I speak fluent Hebrew, English and German.

One of the main issues that I will tackle in the thesis is the challenge of multilevel-selection theory to the idea of natural normativity. Multilevel-selection theory implies that there are multiple levels of selection, such as genes, individuals, groups, and species, and that each level has its own ends or goals. This leads to a pluralist picture of natural normativity, where different levels of selection may have conflicting or incompatible ends. I examine whether this pluralist picture is problematic or realistic, and how it affects our understanding of natural normativity. Another issue that I address is the question of why we should follow the reasons given by evolutionary history rather than the reasons given by our own desires. How can we justify that genetic and social ends are more authoritative or objective than the ends that we set for ourselves? This question becomes especially relevant when we encounter cases where our personal goals contrast with the external natural goals, such as when we choose not to reproduce or not to participate in society. A related issue that I explore is the question of motivation. What can motivate us to act according to the external goals of evolutionary processes, rather than our own preferences or interests? How can we bridge the gap between natural facts and normative reasons? Finally, I investigate the prospects for finding out what is good for us using mathematical models, such as prisoner's dilemma type models. I will check how these models can help us understand the dynamics and outcomes of multilevel selection, and how they can inform our practical reasoning and decision making.

In my view, the practical debate in the realm of robot ethics suffered from conceptual ambiguities. I am interested, on one hand, in the metaphysics of the property of being responsible. The question arises as to whether the property of being responsible depends on our responses which are constitutive of our practice of holding responsible, or if this property exists somewhat independently of our responses and, instead, establishes the normative status of our practice of holding responsible. On the other hand, there is the question of which attitudes are essential to our practices of holding others accountable. Since most theorists concur that certain emotional attitudes and responses are constitutive of the practice of holding responsible, I have long pondered the more profound question of what it is about emotions that enables them to fulfill their role in our responsibility system, and why this practice cannot simply be conceived as "cool and emotionless".

Another question I aim to address is that of the ultimate object of our moral responsibility. Some theorists uphold the common thesis that we can only be responsible for our actions, i.e., actions are paradigmatic objects of our responsibility. However, there are numerous different positions that argue that we are ultimately morally responsible for the action-generating attitudes.